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Security testing is a process of determining risks present in the system states and protects them from vulnerabilities.
But security testing does not provide due importance to threat modeling and risk analysis simultaneously that
affects confidentiality and integrity of the system. Risk analysis includes identification, evaluation and assessment of
risks. Threat modeling approach is identifying threats associated with the system. Risk-driven security testing uses
risk analysis results in test case identification, selection and assessment to prioritize and optimize the testing process.
Threat modeling approach, STRIDE is generally used to identify both technical and non-technical threats present in
the system. Thus, a security testing mechanism based on risk analysis results using STRIDE approach has been
proposed for identifying highly risk states. Risk metrics considered for testing includes risk impact, risk possibility
and risk threshold. Risk threshold value is directly proportional to risk impact and risk possibility. Risk-driven security
testing results in reduced test suite which in turn reduces test case selection time. Risk analysis optimizes the test
case selection and execution process. For experimentation, the system models namely LMS, ATM, OBS, OSS and
MTRS are considered. The performance of proposed system is analyzed using Test Suite Reduction Rate (TSRR) and
FSM coverage. TSRR varies from 13.16 to 21.43% whereas FSM coverage is achieved up to 91.49%. The results show
that the proposed method combining risk analysis with threat modeling identifies states with high risks to improve
the testing efficiency.
Keywords: Security testing; Risk analysis; System states; Risk-driven; Threat modeling; STRIDE; Test suite1 Introduction
Testing is a process of identifying defects and checking
the performance functionalities present in a system. The
main aim of testing is to identify the results when a spe-
cific data is given as input. But the threats present in the
system may lead to system malfunctioning. So security
testing is done to identify the vulnerable states in the
system. It is a type of software testing that intends to
identify uncover vulnerabilities of the system and to de-
termine whether its data and resources are protected
from intruders or not. Security testing focuses on the re-
lated risks present in the system. It covers basic security
concepts namely confidentiality, integrity, authentica-
tion, authorization, availability and non-repudiation.
The concepts of security are applicable to real-time
systems and so models of the system are needed for bet-
ter testing which indeed leads to Model-Based Security* Correspondence: marapriya@pec.edu
Department of Information Technology, Pondicherry Engineering College,
Puducherry, India
© 2014 Palanivel and Selvadurai; licensee Sprin
Commons Attribution License (http://creativeco
reproduction in any medium, provided the origTesting. It relies on models of a System Under Test (SUT)
and its environment. Model-Based Security Testing is a
combination of four approaches namely security testing,
risk-oriented testing, model-based testing and test auto-
mation. Risk-oriented testing uses risk analysis results in
test case identification, selection and assessment to pri-
oritize and optimize the testing process.
Test automation is the process of controlling the exe-
cution of test cases and comparing actual outcomes with
predicted outcomes automatically. Security testing is
mainly done to cover the basic security concepts and to
make a system less vulnerable from attacks. It is import-
ant to identify the threats associated with the system
which identify vulnerabilities in the system.
Threat modeling is a procedure to optimize security
by identifying objectives and vulnerabilities and then de-
fining counter measures to prevent or mitigate the ef-
fects of the threats present in the system. There are
three approaches to threat modeling - they are attacker
centric, software centric and asset centric. Attacker centricger. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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goals. Software centric threat modeling starts from the de-
sign of a system and attempts to step through a model of
the system looking for various attacks against each elem-
ent of the node. Asset centric threat modeling involves
starting from assets entrusted to a system. Since threats
associated with the system must be identified, software
centric approach is suitable for MBST because the entire
system design is to be processed for different types of at-
tacks present in the system. There are different types of
threat modeling processes which are used to identify
threats and to identify stakeholder's risk. There are two
different Microsoft threat modeling processes are STRIDE
and DREAD. STRIDE is an acronym of six types of
threats; Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information
Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege. It
is used to identify both technical and non-technical
threats. DREAD stands for Damage, Reproducibility, Ex-
ploitability, Affected users and Discoverability. It is used
for rating threats and also for quantifying, comparing and
prioritizing the amount of risks associated with each
threat. There is another threat modeling framework, simi-
lar to STRIDE and DREAD, called TRIKE. It is mainly
used to reduce stake holder's risk.
Risk analysis is the quantitative analysis of risk present
in a system. Risk analysis is done based on the threat
modeling results. Risk analysis is performed to find the
vulnerable states that need to be tested. Risk Driven Se-
curity Testing (RST) and Test Driven Security Risk Ana-
lysis (TSR) are the two approaches of risk analysis.
Security risk analysis is a specialized risk analysis ap-
proach in which information security risk associated
with the potential threats will be evaluated. In RST, se-
curity testing is supported by security risk assessment in
order to make security testing more effective. The aim is
to focus the security testing process to carry out security
tests on the most important parts of the System Under
Test, and to execute only the selected test cases. In TSR
security risk analysis is supported by security testing in
order to develop and/or validate risk models. The ob-
jective of TSR is to strengthen the correctness of the se-
curity risk analysis models.
Risk analysis uses risk metrics namely risk probability,
risk impact and risk threshold. Risk probability is the pos-
sibility that a risk can occur. Risk impact is the damage
made by the risk when it occurs. Risk threshold is the
maximum limiting value up to which the risk can be toler-
ated. The product of risk probability and risk impact iden-
tifies the vulnerability of risk associated with the state.
Test cases are selected based on the risk analysis re-
sults so that the states with the high probability of risk
must be tested. Risk analysis optimizes the test case se-
lection and execution process. Reduction in original test
suite is represented using Test Suite Reduction Rate(TSRR). The reduced test suite is subjected to coverage
criteria in order to identify its coverage percentage to
the entire system model. Coverage is the measure of the
degree to which the system is tested. There are a num-
ber of coverage criteria namely statement coverage,
function coverage, branch coverage, condition coverage
and many more. Transition coverage is taken as the per-
formance metric since each system model is represented
in extended finite state machine (EFSM).
Finally, security testing on risk analysis using STRIDE
approach has been taken as a proposal to reduce the test
suite size and to test the most vulnerable states in a sys-
tem by using risk metrics. The system is also evaluated
by parameters namely TSRR and transition coverage to
enhance the performance. This paper is organized as fol-
lows: the section 2 discusses about the related work, sec-
tion 3 describes about the proposed work followed by
implementation, next section 4 analyses the results with
the system description, section 5 concludes the paper
followed by references.
2 Related work
Testing is the process of analyzing the result of a system
for a particular test data. The test results can identify the
errors present in the functionalities. But the risk associ-
ated with the system may also make a system defective
and the type of testing which identifies and minimizes
the defects is known as security testing. Risk is the possi-
bility of attack to a system and the process of determin-
ing the vulnerabilities present is called Risk analysis.
Stallbaum et al. (2008) proposed a system known as
RiteDAP, which generates test case based on activity dia-
grams and optimize those test cases based on risk (Olga
and Vladik 2012). Roongruangsuwan and Daengdej 2005–
2010; (Zimmermann et al. 2009) proposed a prioritiza-
tion technique to optimize multiple test suites and test
cases with same priority values. Priority based opti-
mization is taken from this paper. Sabharwal et al. 2011;
(Roongruangsuwan & Daengdej 2005–2010) proposed to
optimize test case scenarios by identifying the critical
path clusters using genetic algorithm. From this, path
identification is learnt.
Papadakis and Malevris (Papadakis & Malevris 2013)
proposed a framework for the automation of mutation
testing method which uses dynamic search-based ap-
proaches for generating and evaluating mutation based
test data. The concept of generating optimized test cases
is learnt from this paper. Ogata and Matsuura (2013) in-
troduced the new system model, Library Management
System (LMS) for object-oriented analysis and design.
This system model is included as one, in the data set. A
new book evaluation methodology for utility manage-
ment of university library has been discussed in (Yan
et al. 2013); evaluation of LMS is learnt from this paper.
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applications.
In order to make a system less vulnerable to the risks,
security testing and risk analysis is combined into two
approaches namely: Risk-Driven Security Testing (RST)
(Perueux 2013) and Test-Driven Security Risk Analysis
(TSR). RST is a part of Risk-based testing which uses
risk analysis results in test case identification and selec-
tion for optimizing the test process (Schieferdecker et al.
2011). It bridges the hierarchy between risk analysis and
security testing (Grobmann et al. 2013) since the essen-
tial risk factors might be missed when risk analysis re-
mains at high level (Sabharwal et al. 2011). TSR focuses
mainly on risk analysis where testing process is carried
out to validate risk models.
Figure 1 shows the design of RST. RST is defined as
Model-Based Security Testing (MBST) that uses risk
analysis (Stijohann and Cuellar 2013) within the securityFigure 1 Risk-Driven Security Testing (RST).testing process (Tim & Paul 2012). MBST is a special
form of Model-based testing (MBT) (Erdogan & Stolen
2012) that focuses on the testing of security properties
of a system (Omar et al. 2012). The first two steps deal
with the identification of test objectives and model. It is
followed by Risk assessment which identifies the risk as-
sociated with the system. The result from the risk assess-
ment is used for test case generation and prioritization.
It is again subjected to risk assessment and the signifi-
cant test cases are executed.
Figure 2 shows the design of TSR. In TSR, risk analysis
is supported by security testing in order to develop or
validate risk models. The first step is to find the target
system for risk analysis. It is followed by test case gener-
ation and execution for the development of risk models by
identifying potential risks which is subjected to risk assess-
ment. The testing process is again repeated to validate risk
models which are then subjected to risk treatment.
Figure 2 Test-Driven Security Risk Analysis (TSR).
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curity testing (RMST) and test-driven model-based se-
curity risk analysis (TMSR) which reduces risk factor by
analyzing risk factor of models. RMST and TMSR are
very much similar to RST and TSR. RMST and TMSR
identifies whether testing is done to improve risk analysis
or risk analysis is done to optimize testing process on each
models.
Table 1 describes about the survey on risk analysis in
security testing and its role in various Risk-Based Test-
ing approaches.
Mitrabinda and Durga Prasad 2013; (Grobmann &
Viehmann 2013) proposed a state-based risk assessment
methodology (Diamonds Project 2010–2014) at the ana-
lysis and design stage of Software DevelopmentLife Cycle.
The parameters used for risk assessment are complexity
and severity. The risk for a scenario is estimated basedon the risk of interacting components in various states
within the scenario and StateCOllaboration TEst Model
(SCOTEM) of the scenario.
3 Proposed system
A methodology for testing the systems using risk based
approach named STRIDE has been introduced in ana-
lysis of security threats. By combining the risk analysis
with threat modeling approach, risk based testing is
performed.
3.1 Proposed work
The proposed Security Testing system mainly based on
two concepts namely Risk Analysis and Threat Modeling
approach. Threat modeling is based on the notion that
any system or organization has assets of value worth pro-
tecting, these assets have certain vulnerabilities, internal
Table 1 Study on risk-based security testing
Sl. no. Title Year Techniques Metrics Systems/models used
1 Risk-driven Security Testing
versus Test-driven Security
Risk Analysis






2 Baseline for Compositional
Test-Based Security Risk
Assessment







3 Baseline for Compositional
Risk-Based






4 Risk-based Statistical Testing:
A Refinement based
May 2009 Model-based statistical
testing, Markov chain
test models
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Critical systems like fire
alarm, railway control system
Approach to the Reliability









Security Audit of Supplier
services, Maintaining
security in virtual organization
Palanivel and Selvadurai SpringerPlus 2014, 3:754 Page 5 of 14
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/754or external threats exploit these vulnerabilities in
order to cause damage to the assets, and appropriate
security countermeasures exist that mitigate the
threats. The different states and transitions present in
the system model are defined by EFSM diagram and
what are all possible threats for each state is found
using STRIDE approach. STRIDE threat model is
used to identify technical and non- technical threats
associated with the states of the system. STRIDE
stands for:Figure 3 Overall system design. Spoofing identity: An example of identity spoofing is
illegally accessing and then using another user's
authentication information, such as username and
password.
 Tampering with data: Data tampering involves the
malicious modification of data. Examples include
unauthorized changes made to persistent data, such
as that held in a database, and the alteration of data
as it flows between two computers over an open
network, such as the Internet.
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users who deny performing an action without other
parties having any way to prove otherwise—for
example, a user performs an illegal operation in a
system that lacks the ability to trace the prohibited
operations. Non-repudiation refers to the ability of a
system to counter repudiation threats. For example,
a user who purchases an item might have to sign for
the item upon receipt. The vendor can then use the
signed receipt as evidence that the user did receive
the package.
 Information disclosure: Information disclosure
threats involve the exposure of information toFigure 4 Workflow diagram for state representation module.individuals who are not supposed to have access to
it—for example, the ability of users to read a file
that they were not granted access to, or the ability
of an intruder to read data in transit between two
computers.
 Denial of service: Denial of service (DoS) attacks
deny service to valid users—for example, by making
a Web server temporarily unavailable or unusable.
You must protect against certain types of DoS
threats simply to improve system availability and
reliability.
 Elevation of privilege: In this type of threat, an
unprivileged user gains privileged access and
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destroy the entire system. Elevation of privilege
threats include those situations in which an attacker
has effectively penetrated all system defenses and
become part of the trusted system itself, a
dangerous situation indeed.
Risk Analysis is carried out for each state based on
threats and their risk values. The risks associated with
various threats are identified using risk parameters like
Risk possibility, Risk threshold and Risk impact. Based on
Risk Analysis results, the more vulnerable test cases are
identified. The overall system design is shown in Figure 3.
The modules in the system are as follows:
1. State representation module.
2. Threat modeling module.
3. Risk analysis module.
4. Test case selection module.Figure 5 Workflow diagram for threat modelling.3.2 State representation module
The system model is chosen and the states are defined
and it is depicted using EFSM diagram then input is
represented using EFSM txt file which contains all
possible transitions and the workflow is shown in
Figure 4. Transition refers to path between the start
state and end state. After that the adjacency list is ob-
tained from the model and the dependency between
the states is found using adjacency matrix. If depend-
ency between states is high, then the system is highly
vulnerable.
3.3 Threat modeling module
In the system model where all states and its correspond-
ing transitions are known the data flow diagram based
on the states and process is drawn which depicts the
flow of data in current system shown in Figure 5. It is
used to identify the threats present in the system.
STRIDE thread model identify six attacks namely
Table 2 Applying STRIDE threat modeling
Element Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information disclosure Denial of service Elevation of privilege
Data Flow X X X
Data Store X X X
Process X X X X X X
Interactor X X
X- Threats Covered.
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ure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. This
model checks out of these attacks which one will be
more prone to the system.
3.3.1 Data flow diagrams
Data flow diagrams (DFDs) are typically used to graphically
represent a system model. DFD consists of four elements
namely data flow, data store, process and interactor.
Table 2 describes about the threats covered by the
each element in the data flow diagram representation of
the system model.
3.4 Risk analysis module
In this module, the states which have threats are taken
and it is sent for risk analysis. It is a process step
which analyzes and identifies risk based on parameters
known as Risk possibility, Risk Impact and Risk
Threshold and is shown in Figure 6. Risk Possibility re-
fers to how much the system is vulnerable. It tellsFigure 6 Workflow diagram for risk analysis.whether system will be attacked by a threat or not.
Risk Impact refers to effect of risk on other states in
system model. It depends on dependency matrix which
tells how much a certain risk will affect the system.
Risk Value refers to product of Risk Possibility and its
impact. Based on the value, risk will be compared with
risk threshold and such state will be assigned with
high, medium and low risks.
3.4.1 Risk calculation
Risk at each state ¼ Risk Possibility  Risk Impact
where:
 Risk Possibility = Possibility of attacks in each state
 Risk Impact = Number of states affected with impact
of risk in each state
 Risk possibility depends on Data Flow Diagram
representation of risks which in turn helps to
identify risks present in the system.
Figure 7 Workflow diagram for test case selection and execution.
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the states in the system.
 Risk Threshold is the range of risk value upto which
risk is tolerable. Risk threshold value varies for
various systems.Figure 8 EFSM for Library Management System (LMS).3.5 Test case selection module
The module is used to select which test cases have high
vulnerability and test them under various attacks. Based
on risk evaluation results the states will be grouped
apart as high, medium and low based on their risk
Figure 9 EFSM for Automated Teller machine (ATM).
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transitions involving states involving states with high risk
are selected and the test cases are executed. In each
state, test cases selection and execution flow is shown in
Figure 7.4 Results and discussion
The system models considered for experimentation are
Library Management System (LMS), Automated Teller
Machine (ATM), Online Banking System (OBS), Online
Shopping System (OSS) and Movie Ticket Reservation
System (MTRS) to evaluate the performance of riskFigure 10 EFSM for Online Banking System (OBS).analysis and threat modeling. These models are men-
tioned under the data set description.
4.1 Data set description
The following are EFSM models considered for the
experimentation.
a) LMS
The EFSM representation of LMS consists of 7
states and 13 transitions which are shown in
Figure 8. The main operations involved in LMS are
renewal of membership, issue of books and
reservation of books. LMS starts with checking of
Figure 11 EFSM for Online Shopping System (OSS).
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If ID is already expired then the user has to renew
membership to borrow or reserve books. Each user
can borrow a maximum 4 books. If the user exceeds
the maximum limit or a book needed by the user is
already issued then reservation of the book is only
allowed. A user may borrow a book only if the book
is available for issue and the user has not reached
the maximum limit.
b) ATM
The EFSM representation of ATM system consists
of 3 states and 9 transitions shown in Figure 9. The
main operations in ATM system are checking of
balance, withdrawal and deposit of money. ATM
system initiates with prompting of pin number from
user. If a user enters incorrect pin number for moreFigure 12 EFSM for Movie Ticket Reservation System (MTRS).than 3 times, the card will be automatically ejected.
If a user is authorized, then the user may withdraw
or deposit money to a maximum of two times
during the same transaction.
c) OBS
The EFSM representation of OBS consists of 4
states and 18 transitions shown in Figure 10. OBS
can be accessed by admin or the account holder.
Admin can view the account of any user or any
pending account, change username and password
for any user and also be able to view the balance
amount in an account. Account holder can view
previous transaction, transfer funds to another
account and change username and password. A user









Figure 13 Comparison of various test suite sizes for each system model.
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The EFSM representation of OSS consists of 8
states and 14 transitions shown in Figure 11. OSS
allows the user to buy electronics accessories,
household accessories and other miscellaneous
products over internet. A user needs to create an
account to purchase products. The user may use
the same account for future purchases. For every
login, the user may purchase to a maximum of 3
products. The payment might be online payment or
cash on delivery.
e) MTRS
The EFSM representation of MTRS consists of 7
states and 13 transitions shown in Figure 12.
MTRS allows a user to reserve movie tickets
based on location, theatre, movie and date. The
user has to pay money online for reservation of
tickets and has to provide personal details for
authentication. The required number of tickets
can be reserved by searching over various
theatres for various films.4.2 Description of risk value calculation and risk metrics
In order to find the number of risks present in each state
of a system the risk value is calculated using the risk













LMS 7 13 28 22 21.43
ATM 3 9 114 99 13.16
OBS 6 18 209 175 16.27
OSS 8 14 156 126 19.23
MTRS 7 13 160 132 17.54.2.1 Risk value calculation
Risk present in each state ¼ Risk Possibility  Risk Impact
4.2.2 Risk metrics
1. Risk Possibility is the possible threats present in
each state according to STRIDE.
2. Risk Impact is the number of states affected due to
the impact of a threat on a state.
3. Risk Threshold is the range of risk value up to
which risk is tolerable. Risk threshold helps to
identify the states with low, medium and high risks.
4.3 Description of performance parameters
1. The test suite reduction rate (TSRR) is defined as
the ratio of the number of test cases removed from
the original test suite to the number of test cases in
the original test suite.
TSRR ¼ Τ ‐j jΤredj j
Τj j  100%
where:Redu
) in %|T| = Number of test cases in the original suite and
|Tred| = Number of test cases in the minimized/
reduced suitection No. of transitions covered FSM coverage
in %






Figure 14 Comparison of FSM coverage for system models.
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number of transitions in reduced test suite to the
number of transitions in original test suite.
FSM Coverage %ð Þ ¼ No: of transitions in reduced test suite
No: of transitions in original test suite
100
4.4 Result analysis
Test suite minimization depends on risk analysis re-
sults. Test cases with low risk are removed from the
original test suite. Figure 13 shows the comparison
of various test suite sizes for each system model.
Test suite reduction rate (TSRR) refers to the num-
ber of test cases with low risk in the overall test
suite. It is observed that the TSRR value varies from
16.27 to 21.43 for the system models considered
which shows that the proposed system identifiesFigure 15 Comparison of risk values.more risks present in a system. From Table 3, it is
also observed that the system with less number of
states has high reduction rate since dependency be-
tween the states will be high.
FSM coverage is a measure of degree to which the sys-
tem model represented in EFSM is tested by a particular
test suite. FSM coverage should be more for better test-
ing results. FSM coverage value is calculated by the ratio
of number of transition covered in original test suite to
the number of transitions covered in reduced test suite.
From the results, it is observed that the coverage value
varies from 85.87 to 91.49 for the system models consid-
ered which justifies that the reduced test suite of each
system model contains effective test cases. Figure 14
shows the comparison of the FSM coverage value for
different system models. The quantitative results of per-
formance parameters are tabulated and represented in
Table 3.
Palanivel and Selvadurai SpringerPlus 2014, 3:754 Page 14 of 14
http://www.springerplus.com/content/3/1/754The quantitative analysis of risk performed by the pro-
posed system is compared with the existing system.
Existing system does not include threat modeling in risk
analysis and uses complexity and severity as risk param-
eters. On the contrary, proposed system applies STRIDE
threat modeling in risk analysis and uses risk possibility,
risk impact and risk threshold as risk parameters. It is
observed that the quantitative risk value calculated using
proposed system is approximately three times better
than the existing system. Figure 15 shows the compari-
son of quantitative risk values between existing and pro-
posed system for each system model.
5 Conclusion
Thus, the proposed system applying STRIDE threat
modeling in risk analysis for identifying risks present in
a system and reducing test cases based on risk analysis
results performed better than the existing system. Exist-
ing system uses a state-based risk assessment method-
ology which does not include threat modeling. It is
observed that the proposed system produced three times
better results in identifying risks present in a system
compared to the existing system using risk metrics
namely risk possibility, risk impact and risk threshold.
Risk analysis helps in the identification and elimination
of test cases with comparatively low risks from the test
suite. The proposed system is analyzed using perform-
ance parameters namely TSRR and FSM coverage. TSRR
varied from 13.16to 21.43 whereas a maximum of 91.49%
FSM coverage is achieved. The results from the perform-
ance parameters also justifies that the proposed system ef-
fectively identifies risks and the reduced test suite provides
better testing of the system models.
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